Bargaining efficiency and the repeated prisoners' dilemma by John Conley & Bhaskar Chakravorti
Bargaining efficiency and the repeated prisoners' dilemma 
Bhaskar Chakravorti John Conley
The Monitor Corporation Vanderbilt University
Abstract
The infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma has a multiplicity of Pareto−unranked equilibria.
This leads to a battle of the sexes problem of coordinating on a single efficient outcome. One
natural method of achieving coordination is for the players to bargain over the set of possible
equilibrium allocations. If players have different preferences over cooperative bargaining
solutions, it is reasonable to imagin that agents randomize over their favorite choices. This
paper asks the following question: do the players risk choosing an inefficient outcome by
resorting to such randomizations? In general, randomizations over points in a convex set
yields interior points. We show, however, that if the candidate solutions are the two most
frequently used −− the Nash and Kalai−Smorodinsky solutions −− then for any prisoners'
dilemma, this procedure guarantees coordination of an efficient outcome.
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We consider the canonical prisoners’ dilemma (PD) given by the bimatrix
game in Figure 1. Any prisoners’ dilemma game (with strictly dominated strategies)
can be transformed into a game of the form given below by subtracting the (b,R)
payoﬀs from all cells and normalizing to one the marginal cost of choosing the
dominated strategy, given that the opponent chooses the dominant strategy.
The players are 1 (the row player) and 2 (the column player). The payoﬀs
are in terms of von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities and the class of PD games is
characterized by {(a,d)=( a1,a 2,d 2,d 2) ∈ <
4 s.t. 0 <a i <d i for i =1 ,2}. We
shall denote the probability with which player 1 chooses t by p1 and the probability
with which player 2 chooses L by p2.
Given (a,d), an allocation is a pair of payoﬀs x =( x1,x 2) residing in X(a,d),
the set of all allocations achievable via mixed strategies. With slight abuse of
notation, we shall simply write X(a,d)a sX.T h e s e t o f a l l individually rational
allocations in X is denoted IR(X) ≡ {x ∈ X|x ≥ (0,0)}.T h e Pareto-eﬃcient
frontier of X is denoted EFF(X) ≡ {x ∈ X|∀ ˆ x ∈ <
2, if ˆ x À x then ˆ x 6∈ X} 1 It
is well known that the unique solution to the PD is (p1,p 2)=( 0 ,0).
Consider now the inﬁnitely repeated PD, with discount factor δ ∈ [0,1] which we
denote (PD∞,δ). By the Folk Theorem for inﬁnitely repeated games (for example,
see Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) for every x in the interior of IR(X) there exists
a ˆ δ such that for all δ ∈ (ˆ δ,1], there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of (PD∞,δ)
with payoﬀ x in every repetition. Given the multiplicity of equilibria in the game
(PD∞,δ), it is not immediately clear how agents coordinate their actions to get a
speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ.
One approach to the problem of multiple equilibrium is to reﬁne the equilibrium
1 The three vector inequalities are denoted À,>,and≥.
1concept. This is a vast literature. See, for example, Kajii and Morris (1997) or van
Damme (2002) for a recent survey of parts of this research. Another alternative is
to modify the way that the repeated game is constructed in order to narrow the
equilibrium set. See Chakravorti, Conley and Taub for an example of this type of
work using probabilistic cheap talk.
In this note, we suppose instead that agents’ agree to resolve this coordination
problem through the use of bargaining theory. In general, a two person bargaining
problem consists of a pair (S,d), where S ⊂ <
2 is interpreted as the set of feasible
allocations over the two agents, and d ∈ S, called the disagreement point, is the
allocation agents receive if they fail to ﬁnd a mutually satisfactory way of dividing
the surplus. In the case of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game described above,
the subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs of stage game can be taken as a set of
feasible allocations which converges to the individually rational set in the limit as
the discount factor goes to one. For simplicity, we take the limiting case and set
S = IR(X). The disagreement point is of course the payoﬀ agents receive when
they choose noncooperative strategies. Thus, d =( 0 ,0) in our case. Note that the
IR(X) is closed, convex and comprehensive set which contains elements that strictly
dominate the disagreement point. A bargaining solution is a function φ which maps
a class of bargaining problems Σ into <
2
+ such that for all (S,d) ∈ Σ,i ti st h ec a s e
that φ(S,d) ∈ S.
More formally, we consider a situation in which agents resolve the problem of
multiple subgame perfect equilibria using the following procedure.
1. First, a bargaining problem is generated by taking the set of individually ratio-
nal allocations, IR(X), as the set of feasible payoﬀs, and the payoﬀ associated
with agents jointly playing defection strategies, (b,R), as the disagreement
point.
2. Each player i proposes a bargaining solution, φi to resolve the bargaining
(IR(X),0) which the agents face each time the stage game is played. In general,
2it is likely that φi 6= φj.
3. A public randomization over the alternative solution outcomes φi(IR(X),0)
and φj(IR(X),0) is used to determine the allocation to be implemented. Let
P(IR(X),0) denote the allocation thus implemented in any given round of the
stage game.
The speciﬁc question we are interested in is whether or not there are circumstances
under which this procedure will lead to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes.
2. Some Deﬁnitions
We begin this investigation by recalling the deﬁnitions of the two central solu-





(x1 − d1)(x2 − d2).
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), K is found by tak-
i n gt h em a x i m a le l e m e n ti nt h ef e a s i b l es e to nt h el i n ec o n n e c t i n gt h ed i s a g r e e m e n t
point and the ideal point Formally, the ideal point is deﬁned as:







and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is deﬁned as:
K(S,d) ≡ {x ∈ S | ∃λ ∈ [0,1] s.t. x = λd +( 1− λ)a(S,d)a n d 6 ∃z ∈ S, s.t. z À x}
These two solutions can be characterized by sets of axioms. We now give formal
deﬁnitions of the axioms which are necessary for our purposes:
3A permutation operator, π,i sab i j e c t i o nf r o m{1,2,...,n} to {1,2,...,n}. Πn
is the class of all such operators. Let π(x)=( xπ−1(1),x π−1(2),...,x π−1(n))2 and
π(S)={y ∈ <n | y = π(x)x ∈ S}.
Symmetry (SYM): If for all permutation operators π ∈ Πn, π(S)=S and
π(d)=d,t h e nFi(S,d)=Fj(S,d) ∀ i,j.
An aﬃne transformation on <n is a map, λ : <n → <n, where for some a ∈
<n and b ∈ <n
++, λ(x)=a + bx. Λn is the class of all such transformations. Let
λ(S)={y ∈ <n | y = λ(x),x∈ S}.
S c a l eI n v a r i a n c e( S . I N V ) : ∀ λ ∈ Λn, F(λ(S),λ(d)) = λ(F(S,d)).
Individual Monotonicity (I.MON): For all (S,d),(S0,d 0) ∈ Σ,s u c ht h a t
d = d0 and S ⊆ S0 if aj(S,d)=aj(S0,d 0)f o rs o m ej =1 ,2, then
φi(S0,d 0) ≥ φi(S,d).
It is well known that both the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions satisfy
the SYM and S.INV axioms while the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution alone satisﬁes
the I.MON axiom.
3. Result
We provide the following answer to the question posed above:
Theorem 1. If φi = N and φj = K,t h e nP(X) ∈ EFF(X).
Proof/
2 Subscripts indicate the components of a vector
4Suppose that the theorem were not true. Refer to (IR(X),O)w h e r eIR(X)=
ABCO given in Figure 2. In this case, without loss of generality, suppose that
K(IR(X),O) picks the allocation K and N(IR(X),O) picks the allocation N on
EFF(X) ∩ IR(X). Next, consider the bargaining problem AECO g i v e ni nF i g u r e
3. Note that E is to the left of C and to the right of K3 Since a(AECO,O)=
a((IR(X),O), it holds that K(AECO,O) picks the allocation K0. Next, con-
sider the smallest triangle containing AECO,( i . e . AFO). By the I.MON ax-
iom, K1(AFO,O) ≥ K1(AECO), since a1(AFO,O) >a 1(AECO,O). In words
this means that the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome of the problem AFO must not
lie to the left of K0.B y d e ﬁnition, N is the point of contact between two convex
sets (i.e. the upper contour set deﬁned by the rectangular hyperbola in X and
the bargaining problem (IR(X),O) whose interiors are non-intersecting). Since
IR(X) ⊂ AFO,a n dAFO is convex, we have N(IR(X),O)=N(AECO,O)=
N(AFO,O). By the axioms of S.INV and SY,g i v e nt h a tAFO is triangular,
N(AFO,O)=K(AFO,O). Given that N is to the left of K0,w eh a v eac o n t r a d i c -
tion.
4. Conclusion
We conclude that for all two person prisoners’ dilemma problems, the Nash and
Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions suggest allocations on the same facet of the feasible
set, and so any randomization between these solutions will also be Pareto eﬃcient.
3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that our previous ﬁgure fell outside of the domain
of problems we consider.
5Thus, while the noncooperative equilibrium concept of subgame perfection leave too
many equilibria and no prediction about which of these the agents will eventually
settle on, we ﬁnd that cooperative solution concepts can resolve this problem in a
Pareto eﬃcient way even when agents disagree about which solution to choose.
References
Chakravorti B., J. Conley and B. Taub (2002): “Probabilistic Cheap Talk,”
Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, pp. 281-294.
Fudenberg, D and E. Maskin (1986): “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games
with Discounting and Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, vol. 54, pp.
522-54.
Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1997): “Reﬁnements and Higher Order Beliefs: A
Uniﬁed Survey,” Northwestern Center Working Paper No. 1197.
van Damme, E. (2002): “Strategic Equilibrium,” in Handbook of Game Theory
with Economic Applications Volume 3, by R. Aumann and S. Hart, North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
Kalai, E. and M Smorodinsky (1975): “Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining
Problem,” Econometrica, vol. 43, pp. 513-18.










































   | 
_  -1  Player 1
Player 2
 d1 
   | 
 
  a1 
   | 
 
_  a2 
_  d2 
 -1 
   | 




   | 
 
  a1 
   | 
 
_  a2 






B  N  K′ 
K 
C 
Ideal point
A 
B 
C 
Ideal point
A 
B 
C 
Ideal point
A 
F 
E 
E 
O 